Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 9

Issue 4

Article 9

10-1-1992

Scott MacDonald, ed., BEING AND GOODNESS: THE CONCEPT OF
THE GOOD IN METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY
David Burrell C.S.C.

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Burrell, David C.S.C. (1992) "Scott MacDonald, ed., BEING AND GOODNESS: THE CONCEPT OF THE GOOD
IN METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 9 : Iss. 4 , Article 9.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19929444
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol9/iss4/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

538

Faith and Philosophy

is of course a controversial claim, at least as applied to Aquinas, but 1 believe
YearJey is correct.) Hence, if we are to identify significant similarities between the theories of Mencius and Aquinas, we will be most likely to be
successful when comparing their practical theories of human flourishing and
its corresponding virtues. And Yearley argues that this is indeed the case.
Although they are clearly dissimilar in many ways, Mencius' and Aquinas'
accounts of the virtues, analyzed along the lines suggested by Aquinas' analogical theory of virtue, reveal unexpected and illuminating similarities. For
example, while the notion of dispositions is more congenial to Aquinas'
theory than to Mencius', it nonetheless serves to illuminate a range of notions
in the latter; in turn, Mencius' reflections on automatic reactions can help to
clarify Aquinas' accounts of intelligent dispositions, habits, tendencies, and
invariant reactions. This means of analysis therefore serves to clarify the
thought of two very different moral theorists, to bring to light unexpected
similarities between them, and to aid us in our own efforts to think through
the issues that they raise.
It is unfortunate that a book of this sort, which crosses so many disciplinary
lines, will probably be neglected by many "pure" scholars in the fields of
moral philosophy, religious ethics, and the history of moral thought. YearJey
has written what is one of the most significant books in recent years in all of
these areas. His approach will of course be controversial, not least because
he contends that the moral thought of at least some religious thinkers can be
understood apart from their religious theories, to some degree at least. But
the questions that his book raises are a mark of the cogency and importance
of his arguments. His treatments of Mencius and Aquinas are always illuminating, and while 1 did not agree with his interpretations of Aquinas at every
point, his treatment of Aquinas' theory of the virtues is by far the best that I have
ever seen. (I am not competent to evaluate his interpretation of Mencius.) Even
more importantly, he has managed to offer a method for the comparative study
of religious ethics that is at least prima facie plausible, and whether it is
finally judged to be successful or not, that in itself is a rare and important
achievement. No serious scholar of moral thought in any of its forms can
afford to neglect this seminal book.

Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, edited by Scott MacDvnald. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pp. ix and 328. $43.95 (cloth)/$14.95 (paper).
Reviewed by DAVID BURRELL, C.S.C., University of Notre Dame.
As the title suggests, this collection testifies to the renewed interest in medieval philosophical theology. The subtitle is also suggestive, reminding us that
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'good,' like 'being,' is a transcendental, and so can enjoy the pervasive metaphysical status evidenced in Plato as well as span "the distinction" between
creator and creatures introduced by biblical and Qur'anic perspectives. Moreover, as we shall see, the most illuminating essays will exploit the difference
as well as the connection which "the distinction" entails, displaying how
metaphysically fruitful the doctrine of creation can be. Indeed, I shall argue
that creation is the hidden thread weaving these disparate essays into a plausible narrative, and bridging the gap which the editor dramatizes between two
approaches to the metaphysics of goodness, focussing on participation or on
nature, respectively. In his introductory essay, as well as the chapter devoted
to Albert on transcendentals, MacDonald makes heavy weather of the difference between the two strategies, even while acknowledging "Aquinas' struggle to reconcile [them] in his highly original conception of the divine nature
and of God's relation to creation" (6). Yet one suspects Aquinas' originality
to rest with his formulation more than his intent: that is, to express a shared
faith in creation as utterly free yet best imaged by a pattern of emanation
itself suggestive of participation. Natures, in other words, were understood
by medievals to be created natures, and thereby display in their operations a
being and a goodness participated from the one creator. That overarching
perspective would have saved MacDonald an extrinsic reading of Albert, and
allowed him to present his alternative reading first: that "good adds no reality
in the sense that the properties in virtue of which it holds are not properties
additional to those in virtue of which the thing is a being" (54). A perspecti ve
of creation would have suggested that reading well before Aquinas' original
formulation of such matters.
Ralph Mcinerny and Jan Aertsen offer complementary exegeses of
Aquinas' transformation of Boethius' De hebdomadibus, whence one could
derive a conception of goodness as extrinsic to created natures, which would
themselves be denominated good only by virtue of participating in divine
goodness. Aquinas is the manifest hero of this drama, both metaphysically
(Aertsen) "by means of the notion of 'act'" (65), and semantically (McInerny)
by his insistence "that there are two rationes propriae of 'good' according to
one of which it is first said of creatures and according to the other first said
of God" (96). Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann then expound "the
unusual ethical naturalism that underlies all of [Aquinas'] moral philosophy"
(98), with some fruitful suggestions how such an identification of goodness
with being can ground ethics in a way which supplies a viable alternative to
"divine command" theories. Their naturalistic reading asserts that "Aquinas
would say in general that an object a has goodness (to any extent) as an A if
and only if a has the property of having actualized its specifying potentiality
(to that extent)" (105-6). What one misses in such a formulation is the agency
of a creator bestowing esse, such that any a qua A would be so far forth good,
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for the "actualization of the thing's specifying potentiality" can hardly reflect
an activity of the thing itself. They feel that their strategy requires such an
Aristotelian reading, however, as they wish to present the inherent connection
between being and goodness as an alternative foundation for ethical discriminations, some of which they proceed to sketch out in broad strokes.
Mark Jordan offers a careful and illuminating rendition of Aquinas on "the
transcendentality of goodness and the human will" (129). After delineating
the various senses of appetitus, and the reciprocal causality of the will (as
"rational appetite") with the intellect, he scrutinizes de Malo 6, where
"Thomas says quite clearly that the will can refuse to think actually [actu]
about the highest good" (148). Jordan does not read this capacity for refusal
as introducing "a radically new notion of experienced freedom or [asserting]
a false distinctness in the experience of reciprocity" -notions associated with
a Scotistic view of freedom, but rather links this possibility with "the limits
of the conditions of the present life" (149). Acting on its own cannot be taken
to be paradigmatic for the exercise of free will in Aquinas. Jorge Gracia
focuses on Suarez' distinction of good/evil in itself, and good/evil for another,
and shows how Suarez' attempt to parse "in itself' by means of "for another"
fails to yield a transcendental notion of goodness. So we have an object lesson
that the "doctrine of the transcendentality of goodness" cannot be sustained
in the face of the "clear advantages of a strongly relational understanding of
good and evil" (176). The lesson would be more cogent if readers had been
apprised of those advantages (in this context) as well as had been invited to
a more penetrating analysis of the "traditional scholastic understanding of
evil as privation" (159).
Eleonore Stump's reflections on faith and goodness introduce the section
of philosophical theology. Her subject is the role of wilI in effecting the assent
of faith, a role which becomes problematic on her reading of Aquinas that
"the object of faith, considered from the point of view of human knowers, is
not God but propositions about him" (187, citing ST 1-2.1.2). Yet she goes
on to resolve the problems such a presumption elicits by calling attention to
"what he thinks the point of faith is" (203): what is "made manifest through
the propositions of faith is the goodness of God" (205), which thereby draws
the will to assent to propositions whose truth is not manifest. So reasoning
about such things "may clear away some intellectual obstacles that bar the
believer's way to faith, [but] assent to the propositions of faith is initially
produced by the will's hungering for God's goodness and moving the intellect
in consequence" (207). Indeed; so fixing the point of the activity ought to
modify one's initial perception of the object: propositions would then become
that through which God is believed.
In two consecutive essays, Norman Kretzmann continues to explore an
issue which he had broached in 1983: why would God create anything at all?
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(ch. 8), and why would God create this world? (ch. 9). The questions are
related, since one might expect an account of the first, should one be available, to shed some light on the second. But what reasons might we adduce
to answer the first question? Kretzmann reads the medieval controversy between necessary emanation and free creation of the universe as turning on
whether God has any choice about the matter, where the "libertarian explanation mayor may not go on to say why God freely chooses to create" (208),
calling that fork which eschews any reasons at all "voluntarist, God willed
it" (210). Kretzmann finds Aquinas suspended between "two opposing forces:
Platonist self-diffusiveness and Aristotelian self-sufficiency" (222), and so
,;onstrained to attenuate pseudo-Dionysius' principle that "good by its very
JI1ature diffuses itself" to something which befits God, lest creating be a
natural consequence of God's very goodness. Yet he recognizes that Aquinas'
account of freedom is richer than a libertarian's focus on choosing, so that
God's willing God's own goodness "can be both necessitated and volitional"
(215), in which case God's "decision" to create a universe would amount to
God's freely accepting the intrinsic orientation of the divine nature "calling
for extrinsic, volitional diffusion, or creation" (220). In that case, of course,
God would have no choice about the matter, yet the overflow of goodness
would be at once spontaneous and free. With free creatures, such an account
poses no difficulty (as Jordan reminded us), since a creature's orientation to
"the good" is just that, when the free creature enters into the dynamic of
willing inscribed in its created nature. Yet as a creature, this spontaneous
orientation to "the good" is to its proper fulfillment, which is precisely what
cannot be said about God. So God's free acquiescence in the overflow proper
to goodness would differ from that "necessity of natural order, which is not
incompatible with freedom" (223) which Aquinas associates with creatures,
in carrying no hint of need, as though creation were required to complete
divinity. It is here that Aquinas brings the revelation of God's triunity to bear
(as Kretzmann acknowledges without pursuing): "when we say that in God
there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not
because He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on
account of the love of His own goodness" (ST 1.32.1.3), where the reduplicative "love of" lifts the activity to the intentional level of free gift. To see
how Aquinas' explicit treatment moves the issue to an intentional (or personal) idiom is to render Kretzmann's concluding exposition of Bonaventure
interesting yet redundant as a complement to the fuller picture of Aquinas. It
also allows one to read the drama of redemption as an invitation to free
creatures to participate in that eternally triune mutuality of love as completing
the initial gift of creation. By explicitly patterning creation on the inner
generation of the Word, Aquinas intends to "exclude the error of those who
say that God produced things of necessity" (ST 1.32.1.3) and so underscore
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that all is gift. And since full participation in that life of God would be
"impossible without freedom on both sides of the relationship" (244), this
world will embody the vagaries of free creatures, and hence evil. (The rest
of Kretzmann's treatment of the second question is intriguing, but cannot be
construed as parsing Aquinas, since it is based on his own resolution of what
he took to be Aquinas' irresolution regarding the first question, as well as a
characterization of God's existing necessarily-"that is, in every possible
world" (236)-which ill-fits Aquinas' formula: the one whose essence is
to-exist.)
William Mann's essay on "the best of all possible worlds" offers a model
of conceptual clarification of the ancillary notions and positions surrounding
this vexing phrase: a rationalism (exemplified in Leibniz) which must both
be able to order "possible worlds ... in terms of values" (260) and explain
divine willing as optimal, and a voluntarism which "sees a desert landscape
of equally valueless worlds in the absence of God's will" (268). Mann sets
out to undermine the first presumption of rationalists by sketching two utterly
incommensurable worlds: Teresa as opera singer or hospice worker. His analysis of the example makes clear that "best" can only operate within parameters perceived or decided upon, and that God need not be thought of in either
way regarding creation. What is wrong with the terms of the debate, as Mann
sees it, is that "God's will and God's ·reason are conceived of as separate
faculties or modules of the divine mind" (273). Aquinas' insistence on God's
simplicity undermines the pictures which dominate the debate on either side,
and also allows us to see how necessary truths, like '2 +2=4' are "part of the
expressive content of a perfectly wise will" (275). Aquinas is invoked to
mediate a seventeenth-century debate, in a way which helps to clarify the
terms of that debate, and so dissolve rather than resolve the question. It does
not seem that divine simpleness by itself will do all the work Mann wants it
to do, but his essay offers fruitful leads for those who would explore this
strategy.
Thomas Morris' essay stands in tension with the opening chapters on the
"transcendentality of goodness," since he thumps for the fruitfulness of a
theology centered on "the conception of God as the greatest possible, or
maximally perfect being, an individual who has the greatest possible array
of properties it is intrinsically good to have" (278), presuming the notion of
"maximal perfection" (280) to be coherent and meaningful. He then proceeds
to demonstrate that such a One corresponds to the One which creation-theology identifies as "the singular font of all existence" (281), using generally
accepted theorems regarding causality. Yet we remain unclear why the "maximally perfect being" would also be the origin of all-that-is; only that someone who held both perspectives would be able to assert their identity, in virtue
of the "tight connections" (285) between the two approaches to God. Yet
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since those connections admit of no primacy, mere preference dictates Morris'
conclusion that "the best philosophical theology may yet be one that both
explains being with an eye on creation and navigates its conceptual way by
the coordinates of goodness, absolutely perfect goodness" (297). One might
ctlternatively insist that nothing but a creation perspective could make sense
of "absolutely perfect goodness," so that "perfect being" theology would be
parasitic upon a metaphysics which made creation central, since the "coordinates of goodness" transcend any categoriallimits, and hence would not be
available to us in the ways in which Morris pretends-something which the
rarified abstractness of the argumentation already suggests. And such a criticism would render his resumed argument with William Mann on divine
simpleness otiose as weIl, since the source-of-aIl could never be said to
exemplify "any metaphysicaIly distinct property" (288), but only to be its
source. The subtle relations between being and goodness, explored throughout this exemplary coIlection, could bring some useful sophistication to these
recondite matters.

